Abstract. Given a countable model of set theory, we study the structure of its generic multiverse, the collection of its forcing extensions and ground models, ordered by inclusion. Mostowski showed that any finite poset embeds into the generic multiverse while preserving the nonexistence of upper bounds. We obtain several improvements of his result, using what we call the blockchain construction to build generic objects with varying degrees of mutual genericity. The method accommodates certain infinite posets, and we can realize these embeddings via a wide variety of forcing notions, while providing control over lower bounds as well. We also give a generalization to class forcing in the context of second-order set theory, and exhibit some further structure in the generic multiverse, such as the existence of exact pairs.
Introduction
Forcing is the predominant method of building new models of set theory. From a given model we may build up myriad forcing extensions, adding new objects to our models as we proceed; or we may in contrast dig down on a geological tack to various grounds and the mantle, as done recently by Fuchs, the second author, and Reitz [FHR15] , stripping away any superfluous forcing that might earlier have been performed. By iterating these two operations in turn, we thereby construct a robust collection of models, all ultimately derived from the initial model and exhibiting a certain family resemblance. Namely, we arrive at the generic multiverse of the original model, first defined by Woodin [Woo11] .
1.1. Definition. The generic multiverse of a countable transitive 1 model of set theory M zfc is the smallest collection of models containing M and closed under forcing extensions and grounds. ⋄ We shall simply refer to the generic multiverse, although of course the particular multiverse that arises depends on the original model M , or indeed on any of the models in it, for the generic multiverse of a model is an equivalence class in the corresponding partition of the space of all countable transitive models of zfc. But in this paper, let it be understood that we start from an arbitrary countable transitive model of set theory M , fixed for the remainder of the paper, and consider the resulting generic multiverse of this model. Given a definable class Γ of posets, such as ccc or proper posets and so on, one could just as well consider the Γ-generic multiverse, obtained by forcing extensions and ground models using only forcing notions in Γ. The definition of Γ should be reinterpreted in each model anew, with the restriction to ccc posets, say, being read de dicto rather than de re.
Typically, the generic multiverse is of interest because of the models themselves. After all, it arose because of the study of forcing which gives us new and exciting models of set theory to play with. But the generic multiverse is also an interesting object per se and as a whole. Just as computability theorists are interested not only in the computational content of particular Turing degrees, but also in the global structure of these degrees, so too can set theorists venture beyond the particular models in the generic multiverse and study the structure as a whole. The aspect of this structure in which we are most interested in this paper is simply the inclusion relation between models.
In work growing out of the modal logic of forcing [HL08, HL13] and set-theoretic geology [FHR15] , the second author had inquired whether the inclusion relation in the generic multiverse coincides with the forcing-extension relation (see [Ham16,  Question 1]). Since one might arrive from one model to a smaller model by means of a circuitous zig-zag path of successive forcing extensions and grounds, there seemed at first to be no direct reason to expect the smaller model necessarily to be a ground of the original model. Nevertheless, the second author [Ham16, Theorem 3] had proved that if the downward-directed grounds hypothesis ddg was true, then indeed the inclusion relation was the forcing-extension relation in the generic multiverse. In a major result, Usuba [Usu17] subsequently proved that indeed the generic multiverse is downward directed, establishing the following corollary. The order structure of the generic multiverse has been studied before. For example, Reitz [Rei07] studied the ground axiom, a first-order set-theoretic statement describing the minimal elements in their generic multiverses, and this work subsequently led to the development of set-theoretic geology (see [FHR15] ), the study of ground models and "going down" in the generic multiverse. The second author and Löwe had studied the modal logic both of forcing extensions and of grounds [HL08, HL13] , and the second author had looked further into issues of upward closure of the generic multiverse in [Ham16] .
Turning our glance upward, it is clear that the generic multiverse does not have any maximal elements. However, the upward directedness of the multiverse and the existence of suprema definitely pose interesting questions.
1.3. Definition. Let M be a countable model of zfc and let E be a family of forcing extensions of M . We say that the family E is amalgamable (over M ) if there is a forcing extension M [G] of M that contains every model in E. ⋄
We shall similarly say that a family of generic objects is amalgamable if the corresponding family of generic extensions of M is amalgamable.
It follows from Usuba's results that a collection E as above is amalgamable precisely when it has an upper bound in the generic multiverse of M . Furthermore, a similar fact holds not just for forcing 2 It has been pointed out to us that this lemma may be proved without appealing to ddg; instead, one can show directly that any pair of models in the generic multiverse enjoys a certain uniform covering property, and then apply a theorem of Bukovský [Buk73] to see that, if one model is included in another, then the second one is a forcing extensions of the first. We present the given proof since it seems clearer, and ddg is, after all, a theorem of zfc.
extensions of M , but throughout the generic multiverse: Any given finite collection of models in the multiverse has an upper bound if and only if the collection is amalgamable over some model in the multiverse.
We should also note that the amalgamability of some family of extensions {M [G i ] | i ∈ I} does not require the amalgamating model to have the actual set {G i | i ∈ I} or the associated sequence. Of course, this makes no difference in the case of finite I, but becomes important when discussing the (non-)amalgamability of infinite families.
Mostowski [Mos76] essentially showed that any finite poset embeds into the generic multiverse in a way that preserves the nonexistence of upper bounds. [Ham16] shows that the nonamalgamability phenomenon is pervasive and is exhibited by a much larger family of forcing notions. In the direction of positive structural results, Fuchs, the second author, and Reitz [FHR15] showed that, while not all chains in the generic multiverse have upper bounds, any countable increasing chain arising from posets of uniformly bounded size does have an upper bound. Taken together, these results suggest that the order structure of the generic multiverse is quite complex.
In this paper we will give a number of improvements to Mostowski's result, strengthening the embedding, generalizing to certain infinite posets, and using forcing notions beyond just Cohen forcing. All these generalizations are obtained using a powerful method we call the blockchain construction. The method constructs a family of generic objects by stringing together blocks, each of which conceals a piece of forbidden information. The blocks are furthermore structured in such a way that this secret remains hidden unless we have access to a collection of the generics that was meant to be nonamalgamable. In that case the whole structure of the blocks is revealed, together with the hidden information.
Our main results are the following (see section 2 and section 3 for definitions): 
by finite obstacles on a class I ∈ X and {P i | i ∈ I} ∈ X is a family of pretame Ord-wide class forcing notions, then (A, ⊆) * -embeds into the class-generic multiverse of (M, X ), with each A ∈ A mapping to a forcing extension of (M, X ) by the product i∈A P i .
Beyond generalizing Mostowski's result, we also demonstrate some further complexities of the generic multiverse. For example: Most of our results concerning (non-)amalgamability could be seen in the wider context of the hyperuniverse, the collection of all countable transitive models of set theory of a fixed height. The study of the hyperuniverse was initiated by Friedman (see e. g. [AF13, AFHT18] ) and a number of structural properties of both it and the generic multiverse, including forms of some of the results in our paper, were described by Friedman in a tutorial on the topic given in Münster (see [Fri12] for the slides).
The Blockchain Argument-Following Mostowski
In this section we will present an adaptation of Mostowski's original argument from [Mos76] to the context of the generic multiverse, as well as an improved version thereof. Our purpose in recounting Mostowski's proof is twofold: first, it will serve as a template for our own proofs going forward, and second, the result seems largely unknown and we would like to highlight it (indeed, we had been unaware of Mostowski's result and found the reference only after having made essentially similar arguments on our own). To be clear, Mostowski was interested in studying what was substantially a multiverse of countable models of second-order set theory with a fixed first-order part, together with the corresponding notion of amalgamability. Nevertheless, the methods apply equally well to the generic multiverse setting (and we will return to the second-order context in section 4). In the proof we will construct the reals c n step by step, meeting requirements for amalgamability and nonamalgamability in turn. Since the nonamalgamability steps are the key ones, we first present a simpler construction, where these are the only steps we need to make. For example, any real coding the height of M will definitely be catastrophic for M . The important feature of catastrophic reals is that they cannot appear in any model in the generic multiverse of M . Consequently, our strategy for ensuring nonamalgamability will be to code catastrophic reals between various generics.
Theorem (Mostowski
Proof of Proposition 2.2. We will build two descending sequences of Cohen conditions p n and q n that will each generate their own generic real c and d, and along the way we will also make sure to split a code of a catastrophic real between c and d.
Enumerate the open dense subsets of Add(ω, 1) in M as D n | n < ω and fix a catastrophic real z for M . Suppose that we have already built conditions p m , q m for m < 2n and each pair of conditions p m , q m has the same length. At this stage of the construction we are handed the open dense set D n ; we properly extend the condition on the p-side into D n and pad the condition on the q-side to the same length with 0s. Finally, extend each of the resulting conditions by appending a 1 and then the bit z(2n). This gives us the conditions p 2n , q 2n . At the next stage of the construction we do the exact same thing but with the roles of the two conditions switched and append the bit z(2n + 1). We illustrate the construction in Figure 1 . We now let c := n p n and d := n q n . Clearly both c and d are Cohen reals over M . But note that any model containing both of them would be able to recover z, since the places where we coded z are precisely those places which follow a start marker (i. e. both c and d have a 1 on the previous place-the start marker-and at least one of c and d has a 0 immediately preceding the start marker The key to this argument was that the two generic reals were built in blocks, and within each block only one of them was permitted to be active, that is, to have nonzero bits. This allowed us to use the places where both were active to mark the endpoints of the blocks and thus the coding points where z was hidden.
The proof of Mostowski's theorem will use the same strategy, building a chain of blocks and only permitting certain columns to be active within each block.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Fix an enumeration in order type ω of all pairs (A, D) where A ∈ A and D ∈ M is an open dense subset of Add(ω, A). Also fix a catastrophic real z for M . We again build descending sequences of conditions p n k for k ≤ ℓ, seen as filling in an ω-by-(ℓ + 1) matrix with 0s and 1s. The columns of this matrix will grow into the desired generic reals c k . We will also ensure that at each step of the construction we have completely filled in the matrix below some row and that there are no entries above this row.
Suppose that we are at some stage in our construction and we are handed an A ∈ A and a dense set D ⊆ Add(ω, A). We now properly extend the columns with indices in A to collectively meet the dense set D and pad the remaining columns with 0s to make sure that all columns have the same height. Finally, extend each column by appending a 1 and then the next bit of z. We illustrate the first few steps of this construction in Figure 2 . This completes the construction and we can let c k := n p n k . Given any A ∈ A, the columns in A were given a chance to meet all of the dense subsets of Add(ω, A), and so {c k | k ∈ A} are mutually generic over M , and consequently they are amalgamable.
On the other hand, suppose we are given {c k | k ∈ B} for some B / ∈ A. Observe that the only places where all of the columns in B are active are exactly the coding points for z, since A is closed under subsets, so in between the coding points B always has to have a column padded with 0s. It follows that, given the reals c k for k ∈ B, we can recover the catastrophic real z, which means that the corresponding extensions are not amalgamable.
It is not difficult to see that any finite poset embeds into a family of sets of natural numbers closed under subsets in a way that preserves the nonexistence of upper bounds. It therefore follows from Mostowski's theorem that any finite poset embeds into the generic multiverse while preserving nonamalgamability. This has an interesting consequence for the theory of the generic multiverse.
2.4. Corollary. For each 0 < n < ω let A n (x 0 , . . . , x n ) be the predicate in the language of a partial ordering asserting that the elements x 0 , . . . , x n have a common upper bound. Then the ∃-theory of the generic multiverse in the language {≤} ∪ {A n | 0 < n < ω} is decidable.
Proof. Consider an existential sentence in the specified language. It asserts that there are some objects x 0 , . . . , x m of which some quantifier-free formula ψ( x) holds. The formula ψ, in turn, says that some of these objects are ordered in particular ways and that certain collections of them do or do not have upper bounds. One can clearly check in a computable way whether these requirements are consistent. If they are, we can realize them in a finite poset and our observation above implies that this pattern may be found in the generic multiverse, and therefore that the existential sentence we started with is true in the multiverse.
In the next theorem we shall extend Mostowski's Theorem 2.1 to also include certain infinite posets and also to have the embedding respect nonzero lower bounds.
2.5. Definition. Let P and Q be posets with least elements 0 P and 0 Q , respectively. An injective map f : P → Q is a * -embedding if:
• any finite subset X of P has an upper, or nonzero lower, bound in P if and only if f [X] has an upper, or nonzero lower, bound in Q, respectively. ⋄ It follows from the definition that a * -embedding preserves the least element. Furthermore, the forward direction of the equivalences in the second bullet point easily follows from the fact that f is increasing.
2.6. Definition. A family of sets A is defined by a set of obstacles B on a set I if A consists of the subsets of I that do not contain any element of B as a subset. ⋄
Note that any such family is closed under subsets, since if a set avoids all the obstacles, then so does any subset. For a given family A defined by obstacles, we may assume without loss that I = A, simply by replacing I with A. This amounts to assuming that A contains all singletons from I. We may also assume that the obstacle sets are subsets of I and that they all have at least two elements. So we will generally make these additional assumptions without remark. We shall be principally interested in the case where all the obstacles are finite. 
In the hypotheses of the theorem we of course intend that the set I as well as the set of finite obstacles and A itself are elements of the model M . The same will be true when we discuss corollaries and other versions of this result, such as Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.7.
2.8. Definition. Let I be a set and P i for i ∈ I posets. If p, q ∈ i∈I P i and J ⊆ I, we say that p is a J-extension of q, and write p ≤ J q, if p ≤ q and p↾ I\J = q↾ I\J . ⋄ Thus, a J-extension strengthens the condition only on the coordinates in J, leaving the other coordinates untouched. We emphasize that the relation ≤ J is not simply the pullback of the order on i∈J P i .
Let us point out a useful fact about product forcing that we will rely on several times in the rest of the paper. Suppose that p is a condition in P = i∈I P i , we have some J ⊆ I, and φ is a ∆ 0 sentence in the forcing language of P J = i∈J P i . It is straightforward to check that p P φ if and only if p↾ J PJ φ. It follows from this that any condition in P has a J-extension which decides φ. In the coming proofs we shall use this fact without further comment.
2.9. Lemma. Let X ⊆ Y be sets and let P y for y ∈ Y be posets. Let P Y be the product of the P y (using whatever support you like) and let P X be the subposet corresponding to the coordinates in X. Let χ be a
Then there is a P X -name ρ such that no X-extension of q decides ρ ∈ χ.
Proof. First consider the case X = ∅. So suppose that for every x the condition q decidesx ∈ χ. Let S = {x | q x ∈ χ}. Clearly S is a ground-model set and q χ =Š, which contradicts our assumption.
In the general case, observe that
Applying the previous case in V PX , we can find a P X -name ρ such that
We claim that this ρ is as desired. So fix some r ≤ X q. Then it follows from the above that
but, since r↾ Y \X = q↾ Y \X , we in fact get
which implies that r does not decide ρ ∈ χ, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2.7. We proceed with a blockchain argument very much like in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Some extra care is required since we can no longer terminate blocks by putting 1s across an entire row, as this would prevent any infinite collection of the c i from being mutually generic. Instead we will work with blocks of finite width, and it is precisely the fact that A is defined by finite obstacles that will allow this approach to succeed.
Let B be the set of finite obstacles used to define A. Fix a catastrophic real z for M . We will be filling in an ω-by-I matrix with 0s and 1s, and its columns will grow into the desired Cohen reals c i . We will ensure at each stage of our construction that what we have constructed so far is a condition in Add(ω, I), in effect using finite support in the product. Moreover, we will make sure that this condition is uniform, in the sense that all of its nonempty columns will have the same height. Our construction will again be guided by some enumeration of all the relevant requirements in order type ω. We will, moreover, assume that each requirement is listed infinitely often. At each stage the enumeration will give us either
(1) an A ∈ A and an open dense subset of Add(ω, A), (2) a B ∈ B, or (3) a pair of sets A, A ′ ∈ A, together with an Add(ω, A)-name σ ∈ M and an Add(ω,
Now suppose that we are at some stage of our construction, p is the entire condition in Add(ω, I) we have constructed so far, and we are given an open dense subset D ⊆ Add(ω, A) for some A ∈ A. In this case we simply extend the columns of p in A to meet the dense set D and then pad with 0s, if necessary, to obtain a uniform condition.
If we are given an obstacle B ∈ B, we extend the columns of p in B by appending a row of 1s and then the bit z(n), where n is the number of times that B has occurred in the enumeration before this step. Note that the result is still a condition in Add(ω, I) since B is finite. At the end we pad with 0s to make the condition uniform, if necessary.
Finally, suppose we are given a pair of names σ and τ as above. If p↾ A σ ∈ M [Ġ↾ A∩A ′ ] we do nothing in this step and proceed with the rest of the construction. If this is not the case, we will attempt to find an extension q of p that forces σ = τ . Given our assumption, we can find some
Pick an A-extension of p ′ that decides ρ ∈ σ and pad it with 0s to make it uniform; let p ′′ be the resulting condition. Now consider two cases:
such that q↾ A ′ decides it the opposite way. In this case we pad q with 0s to make it uniform, and the resulting condition is the next step in our construction.
We take this q to be the next step in our construction, after possibly padding with 0s to make it uniform.
Note that this q is as desired: Since q decides ρ ∈ σ and ρ ∈ τ in opposite ways, it definitely forces σ = τ .
This finishes the construction of the reals c i . Let us verify that they satisfy all of the properties in the theorem. If A ∈ A then, in the course of our construction, we considered every open dense subset of Add(ω, A) in M , and we made sure that the columns of our matrix in A met these dense sets. Therefore c i | i ∈ A really is generic for Add(ω, A).
If B /
∈ A, then it must contain an obstacle B ′ ∈ B, and we handled this B ′ infinitely often during our construction, each time adding a row of 1s across the columns in B ′ and the next bit of z. Furthermore, we made sure in our construction to only add a row of 1s across a set of columns if the set was indeed an obstacle set (in which case we also coded a bit of z) or if it was covered by an element of A. Since the latter is not the case for B ′ , we can recover z from the reals {c i | i ∈ B ′ }, and so the family
Finally, suppose that A, A ′ ∈ A and we want to see that
Let x be an element of this intersection; we may assume by
. Pick an Add(ω, A)-name σ and an Add(ω, A ′ )-name τ for x. But we were handed this pair of names at some stage of our construction. At that point it must have been the case that the condition we had forced σ ∈ M [Ġ↾ A∩A ′ ], since otherwise we would have made sure that σ and τ would be interpreted as different sets. But this means that Proof. Let {c i | i ∈ I} be the Cohen reals given by Theorem 2.7. We define a map on A by sending
. This map is clearly increasing. Let us check that it is also a * -embedding.
Now suppose that X is a finite subset of A and that {M [c i | i ∈ A] | A ∈ X} is amalgamable. It follows as above that X ∈ A, so X does have an upper bound in A.
Finally, with X as above, suppose that {M [c i | i ∈ A] | A ∈ X} has a lower bound in the generic multiverse strictly above M . But recall that one of the properties of the Cohen reals constructed in Theorem 2.7 is
. It follows that X is nonempty, and so it is a nonzero lower bound for X in A.
The theorem is actually slightly stronger than stated, since we obtain nonamalgamability in the entire generic multiverse and not just in the restricted multiverse given by adding Cohen reals. On a related note, we can tweak the real z that we coded between the generics to achieve different kinds of nonamalgamability. For example, we could take z to be a sufficiently generic random real over M , in which case the models given will be nonamalgamable in the Cohen multiverse, but amalgamable in, say, the ccc-multiverse.
2.11. Corollary. Any finite poset with a least element * -embeds into the generic multiverse. Moreover, any finite meet-semilattice * -embeds as such into the generic multiverse.
Proof. It is easy to check that the composition of * -embeddings is itself a * -embedding, so, in view of Theorem 2.10, we only need to check that any finite poset P * -embeds into a family of sets A as in Theorem 2.7. We can take A to consist of all sets of the form p↓ := {q ∈ P | 0 P < q ≤ p} and their subsets, where p ∈ P and 0 P is the least element of P , and it is straightforward to see that the map p → p↓ is a * -embedding. If P is in addition a meet-semilattice, we can furthermore observe that both the map p → p↓ and the * -embedding from Theorem 2.10 preserve meets.
Arguing exactly as in Corollary 2.4, we can now deduce the decidability of the existential theory of the generic multiverse augmented with the amalgamability predicates A n and a partial meet operation (seen as a ternary predicate).
2.12. Corollary. Let the predicates A n be as in Corollary 2.4. Then the ∃-theory of the generic multiverse in the language {≤, ∧} ∪ {A n | 0 < n < ω} is decidable.
Generalizing to Wide Forcing
The blockchain arguments given in the previous section clearly generalize to other forcing notions where conditions are some kind of bounded sequence, such as Add(κ, 1) or Coll(κ, λ). The next question we are interested in is whether the nonamalgamability phenomenon (and various * -embeddings) can be realized using an even larger variety of forcing notions, and even possibly while using several nonisomorphic posets at once.
The obvious obstacle to our grand ambition is that there are always pairs of posets such that any two generic extensions of M by these posets amalgamate: just take Add(ω, 1) and Add(ω 1 , 1), for example. Retreating a bit to just consider one poset at a time, some forcing notions P exhibit automatic mutual genericity, meaning that any two distinct generic filters for P are mutually generic. Any two extensions by such forcing are therefore amalgamable. An early example of this phenomenon was Jensen's forcing to add a ∆ 1 3 real of minimal degree over L (see [Jen70] ). Slightly more generally, the second author showed in [Ham16] that, under ♦, there is a Suslin tree exhibiting automatic mutual genericity. The question whether posets exhibiting automatic mutual genericity always exist is open (see [Ham15] ).
Skirting these counterexamples, the second author introduced the notion of a wide poset and proved the nonamalgamation theorem for wide forcing.
Definition ([Ham16])
. A poset P is wide if there is, for any p ∈ P, a maximal antichain in P below p of size |P|. ⋄
For example, the Cohen poset Add(ω, 1) is wide, as are collapse posets Coll(κ, λ), Sacks forcing, Mathias forcing, etc. It is readily seen that the class of wide posets is closed under finite products, finite lottery sums, provided that the factors are all of the same size, and finite iterations (although some care is needed in the specific presentation of the iteration).
The second author went on to show that, given posets P 0 and P 
The products above are to be seen as subposets of the product i∈I P i which may use supports from an arbitrary ideal in M extending the finite ideal on I.
Proof. For X a subset of I we write P X = i∈X P i and similarly for G X . For each i ∈ I we fix an enumeration of P i in order type κ in M . Since the P i are wide in M , we can also find for each p ∈ P i a maximal antichain Z(p) ⊆ P i below p of size κ, together with an enumeration in order type κ. Finally, fix a catastrophic real z for M .
As in the blockchain construction of section 2 we will undertake a construction of a descending sequence of conditions p n = p i n | i ∈ I ∈ i∈I P i whose restriction to each coordinate i will generate the generic filter G i . We will be guided by some enumeration of all the relevant parameters in order type ω. We arrange matters such that at each stage of the construction we are given the following: two sets A 0 , A 1 ∈ A, a dense subset D ⊆ P A 0 in M , and a P A 0 -name σ ∈ M and a P A 1 -name τ ∈ M , both for subsets of M [Ġ A 0 ∩A 1 ] (of course, we want to run through all the possible combinations of these parameters).
Before we start the construction, let us briefly describe the idea. The key property of the wide posets P i will be that, given a condition p ∈ P i , a generic G i containing p picks out a unique element of the antichain Z(p), which amounts to, in view of our fixed enumeration, a particular ordinal below κ. We could, for example, use this mechanism to encode the bits of the catastrophic real z as we were building our sequence of conditions p n . This approach would be similar to what we did in the proof of Theorem 2.7. However, since the structure of the posets P i may be more complicated than that of Cohen forcing, we might, along the way, lose track of the coding pointsthose conditions whose corresponding antichains we should consult to decode z. To remedy this, we will keep track of the coding points used at each stage and code not only the catastrophic real z but also the next set of coding points. In addition, at various points in the construction we will want to record one of three additional special symbols (say ♯, ♭, and ♮) which will serve to mark which case of the construction we are in. These special symbols will be used in the decoding process to signal which generic to look at to recover further information.
We start the construction by letting p i 0 be the top condition of P i for each i ∈ I. Now suppose that we have constructed p n and are given A n , respectively, in some fixed enumeration of I in V in order type ω. We also assume that we have, along the way, built a sequence of conditions c m ∈ P I which are the coding points used at stage m. To be precise, for each m < n and each i ∈ B 0 m we assume that p (note that all of these are essentially finite subsets of κ, so it makes sense to code them together by a single ordinal below κ). If we additionally make sure that p Returning to our construction at stage n, it remains for us to build c n ≤ p n in such a way that c n ↾ B 0 n will be recoverable from p n ↾ B 0 n and a well-chosen generic. First of all, we can find
. We now have a small tree of cases to consider.
. In this case we just let c n ≤ q n be the extension obtained by coding the symbol ♯ below the conditions on the coordinates i ∈ B 0 n and keeping the other coordinates. In particular, since B 0 n is disjoint from A 0 n , once we know p n ↾ B 0 n and a generic
. In this case we will attempt to find a condition c n which forces σ = τ . We can apply Lemma 2.9 and get a name ρ for an element of M ρ ∈ τ . Recall that we also have q ′ n ρ ∈ σ, so this does not seem to be a good way to go if we want to end up forcing σ = τ . So we are going to try to undo past mistakes and work instead with the condition q
. The key property of this condition is that it still forces ρ ∈ τ but it does not decide ρ ∈ σ since it is essentially an (A n . This finishes the construction of c n and p n+1 . It still remains for us to show that the generic filters G i obtained this way have the desired properties. Of these, property (1) is easiest, since it is clear that we have ensured genericity by running through all the dense sets corresponding to any particular A ∈ A. Property (3) is also not difficult to see. Suppose that we are given an element
. Let σ and τ be the P A 0 -and P A 1 -names for x, respectively. We may assume, by ∈-induction, that x is in fact a subset of M [G A 0 ∩A 1 ]. These two names were considered at some stage of the construction, at which time one of two things occurred: Either it was forced at that stage that σ ∈ M [G A 0 ∩A 1 ], or we arranged matters so that it was forced that σ = τ . But the second option could not have happened, since the two names both evaluate to x. It therefore follows that
Finally we turn to property (2). Suppose that we have a set B ∈ M which does not belong to A and we wish to show that the family {M [G i ] | i ∈ B} does not amalgamate. Since A is defined by finite obstacles, it suffices to show this for the finite obstacle sets B. We will argue that, given the filter G B and some parameters in M , we can recover the catastrophic real z, which prevents amalgamability. Since B is finite, there is some n so that for all larger m we have B ⊆ A together with G i 0 again, codes all the information we required. Similarly, if we see a ♭, we know that the construction went through Case 2b. We should compute q ′ n ↾ B 0 n ∪B 1 n , as described above, and see whether the ♭ is followed by a ♮: if so, we know that we proceeded through Case 2b (ii) and we use G i 0 to recover c n ↾ B 0 n , and if not, we proceeded through Case 2b (i) and we use G i 1 in the same way.
In the exact same way as we proved Theorem 2.10 using Theorem 2.7, we can use Theorem 3.2 to prove the following.
3.3. Theorem. Let I, A, and the posets P i be as in Theorem 3.2. Then (A, ⊆) * -embeds into the generic multiverse given by products of the posets P i (and mapping ∅ to M ).
(Non-)Amalgamability in the Class-Generic Multiverse
In this section we turn our attention to the context of different possible collections of classes for a fixed countable model of zfc, the original context in which Mostowski [Mos76] was interested. Specifically, he was interested in the structure of models of Gödel-Bernays set theory whose firstorder parts are all the same countable transitive model of zfc. He investigated the possible patterns of (non-)amalgamability of these models. Just as we generalized his argument in the set forcing case, we can do the same for class forcing. The results of this section are an adaptation of the results about wide forcings in section 3.
We will treat models of second-order set theory as two-sorted structures (M, X , ∈ (M,X ) ) with sets or first-order part M and classes or second-order part X . We will suppress writing the membership relation, referring simply to (M, X ). We may always assume that X is a collection of subsets of M . If M is transitive with the true ∈ as its membership relation, then so is X and the set-set and set-class membership relations of (M, X ) are the true ∈.
4.1. Definition. Gödel-Bernays set theory gbc with the axiom of Global Choice is the secondorder set theory axiomatized by zfc for sets, Class Extensionality, Class Replacement, Global Choice (in the form there is a class bijection Ord → V ), and Elementary Comprehension (i. e. Comprehension for formulae with only set quantifiers (but allowing class parameters)). Dropping Powerset from the axioms for sets gives the theory gbc − .
3

⋄
To make the argument work we will need a slight strengthening of gbc in the ground model.
Definition. Elementary Class
Choice ecc is the schema asserting that if for every set there is a class witnessing some first-order property, then there is a single class coding witnesses for each set. Formally, let φ(x, Y, A) be a first-order formula, possibly with a set or class parameter A. The instance of ecc for φ(x, Y, A) asserts that if for every set x there is a class Y such that φ(x, Y, A) then there is a class C such that for every set x we have that φ(x, (C) x , A) holds, where (C) x = {y : (x, y) ∈ C} is the x-th slice of C. ⋄
Theorem (Gitman-Hamkins [GH] 4
). Kelley-Morse set theory 5 does not prove ecc.
Theorem (Williams [Wil18, Corollary 2.48]). If (M, X ) is a model of gbc − + etr then there is Y ⊆ X second-order definable such that (M, Y) is a model of gbc
− + etr + ecc. 6 As a consequence, the following pairs of theories are equiconsistent:
• gbc + etr and gbc + etr + ecc. 3 In the absence of Powerset we have that Collection is stronger than Replacement [Zar96] . We want gbc − to be axiomatized with Collection, as the version with only Replacement is badly behaved [GHJ16] . Also, the various forms of Global Choice require Powerset to prove their equivalence. Without Powerset, the existence of a class bijection Ord → V is the strongest. We will use this strongest form of Global Choice in the proof of Theorem 4.7. 4 This paper has not appeared in publication, but slides can be found online [Git14] . 5 Recall that Kelley-Morse set theory is axiomatized by the axioms of gbc plus the full Comprehension schema for all formulae, even those with class quantifiers. 6 See [GH17] for a definition of Elementary Transfinite Recursion etr, originally due to Fujimoto [Fuj12] . The theory gbc + etr is stronger than gbc in consistency strength, but weaker than Kelley-Morse set theory and indeed weaker than gbc + Π 1 1 -Comprehension.
• gbc − + etr and gbc − + etr + ecc.
Next we need a definition of wide forcing specialized to the context of class forcing.
4.5. Definition. A class forcing notion P is Ord-cc (synonymously, has the Ord-chain condition) if every antichain of P is set-sized. ⋄ 4.6. Definition. A class forcing notion P is Ord-wide if for every condition p ∈ P we have that P restricted below p is not Ord-cc. That is, below any condition in P there is a proper-class-sized antichain. ⋄ For the generic multiverse of a model of second-order set theory we want to confine the collection of forcing notions we allow to only the pretame forcings. 7 The reason is two-fold. First, pretameness is equivalent to the preservation of gbc − [Sta84, Fri00] . Indeed, if a class forcing is not pretame then any forcing extension by it will fail to satisfy Replacement [HKS18] . This is problematic for nonamalgamability arguments, as it is Replacement which allows us to argue that a forcing extension of M cannot contain a catastrophic real for M . Second, gbc is not strong enough to prove that every nonpretame forcing notion admits a forcing relation [HKL + 16] . With this in mind, say that the class-generic multiverse of a countable transitive model of second-order set theory (M, X ) is the smallest collection of models containing (M, X ) and closed under grounds and extensions by pretame class forcings. Similar to the set-forcing case, a family of universes in the generic multiverse amalgamates if there is some universe in the generic multiverse which contains all of them.
Given a class forcing notion P ∈ X and a filter G ⊆ P generic over (M, X ), meaning that G meets every dense subclass of P in X , we will write (M, X )[G] for the generic extension of (M, X ) by G. This is defined in the usual way, with the sets of the extension being the interpretations of set P-names in M and the classes of the extension being the interpretations of class P-names in X . If P is pretame then it follows from the preservation of gbc − that the sets in the extension are precisely the classes which are subclasses of sets.
We wish to emphasize that the geology for the class-generic multiverse is not as nice as that for the set-generic multiverse. For example, to argue in Lemma 1.2 that inclusion in the (set) generic multiverse is the same as being a forcing extension, we appealed to the intermediate model theorem. But it is a folklore result that the intermediate model theorem can fail for (tame) class forcings. Nevertheless, these difficulties will not concern us here. We are looking only at forcing extensions of a fixed model, not forcing extensions of grounds of forcing extensions of ... And our method of ensuring nonamalgamability-coding a catastrophic real-rules out amalgamability in the broader generic multiverse, not just among forcing extensions of a fixed model. The primary concern is with models of gbc, but our argument nowhere uses the axiom of powerset, so we state the theorem in a more general setting.
Theorem. Assume (M, X ) is a countable transitive model of gbc
− + ecc, meaning that both M and X are countable, and suppose a family of sets A is defined in (M, X ) by finite obstacles on a class I ∈ X . Let {P i | i ∈ I} ∈ X be a family of Ord-wide forcing notions in (M, X ).
8 Then there are G i ⊆ P i generic over (M, X ) satisfying the following three properties.
(1) If A ∈ A, then i∈A G i is generic for i∈A P A over (M, X ).
The products above are to be seen as suborders of the product i∈I P i , which may use supports from any ideal in (M, X ) which extends the finite ideal.
7 See [Fri00] for a definition of pretameness. 8 To clarify: the P i are proper classes so the literal collection of all of them is too high in rank to be a class. But we can code this collection as a single class via pairs, say using the class C = {(i, p) : i ∈ I and p ∈ P i } so that P i = {p : (i, p) ∈ C} is the i-th slice of C. And we must do something similar for sequences of classes, as we will use below.
Proof sketch. This is proved much the same as Theorem 3.2. We give a sketch of the proof here, making clear where ecc and the strong form of Global Choice are used.
Fix the following notation: For classes A ⊆ I let P A = i∈A P i and similarly for G A . By Global Choice fix an enumeration of M in order type Ord M . Using ecc, pick for each p ∈ P a properclass-sized (= Ord M -sized) maximal antichain Z(p) ⊆ P i below p. Externally to (M, X ), fix z a catastrophic real for M , an enumeration of I in order type ω, and an enumeration of all the relevant parameters from M in order type ω. We will build a descending ω-sequence of conditions p n = p i n | i ∈ I ∈ P I whose restrictions to the i-th coordinate will generate G i . At each stage in the construction we deal with A 0 , A 1 ∈ A, a dense subclass D of P A 0 in X , a P A 0 -name σ ∈ X , and a P A 1 -name τ ∈ X , both for subsets or subclasses of (M, X )[G A 0 ∩A 1 ].
As before, each G i is determined by a descending sequence of conditions p i | i ∈ ω . We ensure that G A is generic for A ∈ A by meeting every dense subclass. And the key point of our construction will be to find coding points which can then be used to guide the decoding process if we are given generics G i for all i in some bad subset of I which is not in A. In light of the global well-order, any element of M can be coded by the index of a condition in the proper-class-sized antichain Z(p) below p. (This uses that the global well-order has ordertype Ord.) As before, we start with p i 0 being the top condition in P i . And the construction proceeds from stage n to stage n + 1 the same as before, breaking down into the same tree of cases.
Having carried out the construction, we can verify (1), (2), and (3) the same as before.
For specific class forcings, we may get the same result assuming neither Global Choice nor Elementary Class Choice. Suppose, as an example, that each P i is Add(Ord, 1), the class of functions from an ordinal to {0, 1}, ordered by reverse inclusion. Then we can code the catastrophic real directly, as in the argument for theorem 2.1. Indeed, this was the forcing notion Mostowski used in his original investigations.
And once again, the exact same way as we proved Theorem 2.10 using Theorem 2.7, and Theorem 3.3 using Theorem 3.2, we can derive the following as a corollary. 4.8. Corollary. Let (M, X ), I, A, and the forcing notions P i be as in Theorem 4.7. Then (A, ⊆) * -embeds into the class-generic multiverse of (M, X ) given by products of the forcing notions P i (and mapping ∅ to (M, X )).
Surgery and the Mutable Blockchain
In this section we wish to revisit the results from section 2 and present an alternative proof of Mostowski's Theorem 2.1. While the obtained result is substantially the same, we believe that the method we employ, surgery, is quite powerful and can be used to answer other questions in the area. The main difference between Mostowski's argument (and the derived blockchain construction) and the surgery method we are about to give is that the blockchain argument creates the required generic objects (and thus the * -embeddings) completely anew, whereas with the surgery approach we will be able to start with generic objects given in advance and modify them in such a way that they realize the desired * -embedding.
We remind the reader that, in this section, we work exclusively with the version of Cohen forcing Add(ω, 1) whose conditions are finite binary strings. We will comment later why other presentations of this forcing notion are not suitable.
The following definition introduces a useful way of surgically modifying one function to match another one on a subset of its domain. 5.1. Definition. Let f and g be (partial) functions defined on ω and let A ⊆ dom(f ) have the same cardinality as dom(g). Let e : A → dom(g) be the unique order-preserving bijection. The graft of g onto f on A is the function f ≀ A g, defined on dom(f ) as:
In other words, the graft f ≀ A g is the result of replacing the values of f on A with the corresponding values of g. If A = dom(g), we omit it and just write f ≀ g. ⋄ 5.2. Definition. Let p be a condition in Add(ω, 1), let D be a dense open subset of this poset, and let n be a natural number. We say that p is (n, D)-immune if any condition q satisfying q(i) = p(i) for all i ≥ n is in D. In other words, a condition is (n, D)-immune if any modification of it on the coordinates below n results in a condition in D.
Given conditions p and q, we say that q is a D-immunization of p if q ≤ p and q is (|p|, D)-immune. ⋄
We should note that any (n, D)-immune condition is itself already in D.
Proposition. Let D be a dense open subset of Add(ω, 1). Any condition
Proof. Fix a condition p. Since we are working with conditions that are binary sequences, there are only finitely many conditions of length |p|, and we enumerate them as q i | i < N . We will build a descending sequence of increasingly immune conditions p i for i ≤ N . Start by letting p 0 := p. In general, given p i , we first letp i+1 be an extension of p i ≀ q i inside D and then define
The existence of immunizations is the main reason why we need to work with the binary sequence version of Cohen forcing in this section. Working instead with conditions as finite sequences of natural numbers, for example, it is not hard to come up with a dense open set D such that no condition at all is even (1, D)-immune.
The utility of immune conditions is that they admit limited amounts of surgery, while remaining in a given dense set. The plan is then to build a generic filter from a sequence of increasingly immune conditions with the hope that the resulting Cohen real will be able to withstand surgery on unboundedly many coordinates while remaining generic. As a simple example, we give the following result, which amounts to an improved version of Proposition 2.2. The set E is dense in Add(ω, 2). This is because, given any condition (p, q) in this poset (where we may assume that |p| = |q|), we can simply find a D-immunization p ′ of p, using Proposition 5.3 and pad q with 0s up to the length of p ′ .
Since E is dense, there is a pair (p, q) ∈ E such that p and q are initial segments of c and d, respectively. Now consider p ≀ q g, where we identify q with q This corollary provides a glimpse of possible improvements to results establishing the existence of * -embeddings into the generic multiverse, such as Corollary 2.11. Specifically, it hints at a possible extension-of-embeddings phenomenon, whereby a * -embedding of a subposet into the generic multiverse could be extended to a * -embedding of the whole poset. Recall that the Turing degrees enjoy this kind of property: if Q is a subposet of P , and moreover an initial segment, then any embedding of Q into the Turing degrees extends to an embedding of Q.
9 It seems likely that a similar result can be proved for the generic multiverse.
Question. Does the generic multiverse exhibit an extension-of-embeddings phenomenon?
That is, if Q ⊆ P are posets and Q embeds (or * -embeds) into the order structure of the generic multiverse, must it be that the embedding extends to an embedding (or * -embedding) of all of P ? If not, is this true under reasonable assumptions on P and Q?
In the case of * -embeddings, it is clear that additional requirements should be put on P and Q in order to avoid trivialities. For example, if two points in Q do not have an upper bound in Q but have one in P , then no * -embedding of Q can extend to a * -embedding of P . One should therefore require, at least, that P not add any upper bounds to points in Q that did not have them before. Answering this question would also have a bearing on the decidability of the ∀∃-theory of the generic multiverse, improving on the arguments from Corollary 2.4 and Corollary 2.12.
One can also consider a wider context. Friedman and Hathaway [FH] recently used a completely different coding method based on Hechler forcing to show that, given any pair of distinct transitive models of set theory of the same height, there is a forcing extension of one which does not amalgamate with the other. This gives a version of Corollary 5.5 in the context of the hyperuniverse. Although Hechler forcing is not wide, and so Theorem 3.2 does not apply, there might be a version of the blockchain argument that can be used with that forcing and their coding method to give a variety of results analogous to the ones in this paper. Notably, Friedman and Hathaway leave the extension-of-embeddings problem for the hyperuniverse open, and it seems that this should serve as a significant goal, likely requiring the combination of their and our methods.
Question. Let P and N be finite sets of countable transitive models of set theory of the same height and suppose that no model in N is a subset of a model in P . Is there a transitive model of that same height that amalgamates with each model in P and does not amalgamate with any model in N ?
Before we perform surgery on a family of Cohen reals to obtain a desired pattern of amalgamability, we will have to prepare them slightly. We now describe this transformation of a family of reals, called priming. 5.8. Definition. Let y : ω → 2 be a real. We say that i is a good point for y if y(i) = 1 and y(i + 1) = 0. We write G(y) := {i | i is a good point for y} and C(y) := {i + 1 | i ∈ G(y)}.
If x, y, z are reals, we write x[z/y] := x ≀ C(y) z. Often y will be clear from context and we will simply write x[z].
If x 0 , . . . , x n−1 , y are reals, the primed version of x with respect to y is x ′ , where
Given reals x 0 , z 0 , . . . , x n−1 , z n−1 , y we will quite often abuse notation and write x ′ for the tuple of the primed reals x Figure 3 . Priming x 0 , x 1 , x 2 with respect to y just above the all-one rows. The picture is again divided into blocks, fit between the good points of y. As we shall see, the structure of the blocks will ensure that genericity properties of the original reals are preserved after priming and surgery. Since the blocks are intended to accept modification via surgery, we might describe the whole construction as the mutable blockchain.
An easy but important observation to make is that, given reals x and y, the primed versions x ′ are never mutually generic Cohen reals, even if the original reals x were. This is because we have ensured in the priming procedure that two consecutive all-one rows never appear, but this would have to happen in a mutually generic family. The following lemma shows that this is essentially the only failure of mutual genericity. If we start with mutually generic Cohen reals, then, after priming and possibly even additional surgery, any proper subfamily of these modified reals remains mutually generic. Moreover, this remains true even if we add some unprimed reals into the mix. 
Proof. This is much like the proof of Theorem 5.4, but expanded to a forcing that adds several Cohen reals and with a proper understanding of immunity for conditions in such a poset. For the purposes of this proof, we shall consider the posets Add(ω, X) to consist of finite binary partial functions, all of whose nonempty columns have the same height. Moreover, if D ⊆ Add(ω, X) is a dense open set, we shall say that a condition p ∈ Add(ω, X) is (n, D)-immune if it remains in D even after any modification of its nonempty columns below height n.
Let D be a dense open subset of Add(ω, A + 1) and fix some ℓ ∈ n \ A. Consider the following subset of Add(ω, m + n + 1):
r has only 0s on the interval [i, |r|), and ℓ is inactive at every point of [i, |r|)} A similar argument to the one in the proof of Theorem 5.4 shows that E is dense. Therefore ( u, x, y) meets E. As in that previous proof, it again follows by an immunity argument that
Using essentially the same idea, we can extend the lemma to deal with a whole matrix of mutually generic Cohen reals, with each row being primed with respect to a different real. We omit the proof, since it is quite similar to the one just given. 
are also mutually generic Cohen reals.
Before we give the main theorem of this section, let us present an easier version that we will use as a building block in the coming proof. While this theorem gives a similar result as Mostowski's Theorem 2.1, the conclusion is slightly stronger. In particular, we now obtain a fixed finite family of reals c k which, by judicious use of surgery, can be modified to witness any desired pattern of amalgamability. Furthermore, as will be apparent from the proof, the real y can be chosen to be quite sparse (in terms of asymptotic density, say), so that the "postoperative" reals will resemble the "preoperative" ones as closely as desired. . Arguing as in that proof, there is, for each A ∈ P(n) \ A, a real z A such that {c
Proof. Let {x
is not amalgamable, since from these reals we could compute {c
| k ∈ A} and we know these reals are not amalgamable.
Now consider the situation when
. On the one hand, note that for any B ∈ A and any k ∈ A we have c We should point out that the reals {c k ≀ y z A | k ∈ A} will not be mutually generic, even when A ∈ A. If that were the case then, taking into account how c k , y, and z A were built, the family {c It is unclear whether the mutable blockchain argument can be modified to achieve the kind of control over the intersections of the resulting generic extensions which would be required to obtain a * -embedding into the generic multiverse, or whether it can accommodate infinite patterns A (compare with the modifications going from Theorem 2.1 to Theorem 2.7).
More Structure in the Cohen Multiverse
In this section we would like to further discuss the structure of the generic multiverse, but more specifically restricted to those extensions which may be obtained by adding a single Cohen real. Theorem 2.10 and Corollary 2.11 show that this structure exhibits a large degree of universalityany finite poset * -embeds into it, along with certain infinite ones, and the embedding can also be made to preserve infima. We believe these results should be seen as analogous to the many theorems about the order structure of the Turing degrees (or even the c. e. degrees), which exhibits a similar kind of universality (although not quite in terms of * -embeddings).
It turns out that there are nontrivial restrictions on the infinitary structure of the Cohen multiverse. The second author and Venturi [Ham16, Theorem 13] showed that countable increasing chains in this structure have upper bounds (a similar but not completely analogous result holds for the whole generic multiverse; see the aforementioned paper and also [FHR15] On the other hand, * -embeddings, as we have defined them, do not capture this infinitary behaviour very well. For example, the reader will quickly convince herself that the inclusion of ω into ω + 1 is a * -embedding. Moreover, any ideal on a set X (such as the ideal of finite subsets) * -embeds into the full power set P(X), regardless of which (infinitary) upper bounds exist in the ideal. It follows that any ideal on ω * -embeds into the Cohen multiverse, even though the ideal will typically not have the finite-obstacle property that we required in our theorems.
To better explore this aspect of the structure of the Cohen multiverse, one might wish to work with a stronger form of * -embedding.
6.2. Definition. Let f : P → Q be a * -embedding between posets. We say that f is a strong * -embedding if, whenever X ⊆ P does not have an upper bound in P , its image f [X] also does not have an upper bound in Q. ⋄
It is easy to see that if
A is a family of sets as in Theorem 2.7 then any * -embedding of A already is a strong * -embedding. Therefore the * -embeddings obtained in Theorem 2.10 and Corollary 2.11 can be taken to be strong * -embeddings. On the other hand, it follows from Theorem 6.1 that the finite-obstacle property is a necessary condition for a family A to strongly * -embed into the Cohen multiverse in any way similar to what we have seen. Note that the * -embeddings we constructed in section 2 (and any embedding which, like those, is based on arrangements of product generics) were strong * -embeddings and preserved finite suprema.
Proof. Let f be the strong * -embedding of A into the Cohen multiverse. Fix a set B ∈ M all of whose finite subsets are in A. We aim to show that B is also in A. Since M is countable, there are, from the point of view of V , only countably many finite subsets of B. Let C be the range of f restricted to the finite subsets of B. Note that A is closed under unions of finite subsets of B, so, since f preserves suprema, C is closed under suprema. The family C is countable, since M is countable, therefore it follows from Theorem 6.1 that C is amalgamable in the Cohen multiverse. By the definition of a strong * -embedding we can thus conclude that B ∈ A. So any subset of I not in A must contain a finite set not in A, and thus A is defined by finite obstacles. The set of obstacles can be taken as the ⊂-minimal subsets of I not in A, and this set is in M .
Continuing with the comparison of the Cohen multiverse and Turing degrees, we now turn to the existence of suprema and infima. First of all, it is an easy consequence of the intermediate model theorem that we can find a supremum of finitely many models in the generic multiverse as long as they are amalgamable.
Proposition. A finite subset of the generic multiverse has a supremum if and only if it is amalgamable.
Proof. Consider two models M 0 and M 1 in the generic multiverse. It follows from the ddg (see section 1) that both of these two models are forcing extensions of a common ground model. We may assume without loss of generality that this common ground model is just M and write
for some M -generic G 0 and G 1 . We may also assume that G 0 and G 1 are sets of ordinals. Now suppose that M 0 and M 1 are amalgamable with upper bound M 2 and consider the model 
. Continuing in this way we can find all of the reals c ′ n as required. We will build the exact pair by filling in two ω-by-ω matrices with 0s and 1s in ω many steps. Throughout the construction we will maintain the requirement that, in each matrix, finitely many of the leftmost columns have been completely filled and the n-th such column differs at most finitely much from the corresponding real c ′ n , and that beyond these columns the matrix is empty. In particular, at any stage of the construction, the matrices will essentially consist of finitely many mutually generic Cohen reals.
In our construction we will run through a fixed enumeration of all dense subsets of Add(ω, ω), as well as all pairs of Add(ω, ω)-names for reals in M . So suppose that we are at some stage of the construction and we are handed a dense set D and a pair of names σ and τ . Suppose that, in each matrix, the first N many columns have been filled. Since these columns are mutually generic, they meet the projection of D onto the first N many coordinates. It follows that we can extend each matrix by finitely many bits to meet the whole dense set D. Now consider the two names σ and τ , or rather, consider the two Add(ω, ω \ N )-names σ ′ and τ ′ obtained by partially evaluating σ and τ by the first N columns of the respective matrices. Let p and q be the finite parts of the two matrices, seen as conditions in Add(ω, ω \ N ). If there is a number k ∈ ω such that there are extensions p ′ ≤ p and q ′ ≤ q which forceǩ ∈ σ ′ andǩ / ∈ τ ′ (or vice versa), respectively, we extend our matrices by these conditions; otherwise we do nothing. Note that if such a k does not exist then p and q already decide all formulasǩ ∈ σ ′ andǩ ∈ τ ′ and decide them in the same way. Finally, we consider each partially filled column in our matrices and complete it to (almost) match the corresponding real c So let x be such a real and fix two names σ and τ from M such that σ d0 = τ d1 = x. This pair of names was considered at some point in the construction, and we attempted at that time to ensure that σ d0 and τ d1 would differ at some k. By our hypothesis there was no k like this, so, as we argued above, the set x = σ d0 = τ d1 appeared already in the extension Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 6.6, replacing the reals c n with the finitely mutually generic c ′ n , and building the real d 1 as an ω-by-ω matrix whose n-th column is almost equal to c ′ n . Arguing as before, at each step we first meet a dense subset of Add(ω, ω) from M and then consider a pair of names σ and τ for reals. The only case in which we should act is if d 1 (or the part of it that we have constructed thus far) does not decide the value of τ . In that case there is some k ∈ ω such that our approximation of d 1 does not decide k ∈ τ , and we extend it to make τ and σ d0 differ at k (note that d 0 is fully generic, so σ d0 is a fully fledged real). Afterwards we fill in the nonempty columns of d 1 using the given Cohen reals c Finally, we wish to examine the relationship between the existence of suprema and infima of models in the multiverse and mutual genericity. Two mutually generic extensions clearly have a supremum. On the other hand, Solovay showed that the intersection of two mutually generic extensions is exactly the ground model, and therefore the ground model is also the infimum of these two extensions in the multiverse. As we will see, neither of these two implications can be reversed and, in fact, the existence of a supremum does not imply the existence of an infimum or vice versa. For the second part we use a result due to Truss [Tru78] We can strengthen the preceding result a bit to show that not even the existence of both a supremum and an infimum suffices for mutual genericity. The Cohen extensions in the preceding theorem were amalgamable in the full multiverse but not in the Cohen multiverse. It is less clear whether the conclusion of the theorem still holds if we require the supremum and infimum to exist in the Cohen multiverse, but we expect that it does. Our construction of an exact pair of Cohen reals can be carried out in a sufficiently large collapse extension of M , and Truss showed that just a Cohen extension suffices. Both of these imply that exact pairs can be amalgamable. On the other hand, it is not clear whether the construction can be combined in some way with the blockchain construction to ensure nonamalgamability.
Question. Can an exact pair be nonamalgamable?
Finally, acknowledging the utility of exact pairs of Cohen reals, we must ask whether their existence is a peculiar fact about Cohen forcing, or whether they can be constructed in other multiverses as well.
6.14. Question. Do forcing notions beyond Cohen forcing also exhibit exact pairs?
